Monday, March 9, 2009

The Three Things That Must Be Considered in Evaluating The Greatness of Mihajlovic

By Lt. Col. Albert B. Seitz
There remains little for the physical record of Draza Mihailovic; sparkplug of resistance; abandoned Minister of War to the throne of Yugoslavia.
On April 18, 1946 a news item appeared in Il Giornale della Sera in Rome from an unidentified Yugoslav source. It reported that on 13 March, after a sustained air-ground attack, in which poison gas was used, Mihailovic had been captured with eleven living followers. They were all that remained of a force of 1020 men. He became a martyr in July.
Three things must be considered in evaluating the greatness of Mihailovich.

First - He set the example for Europe and its conquered people in resistance.

Second - He was of incalculable benefit to Russia in defeating Germany. His revolt at Ravna Gora caused Hitler to delay his time table of attack on Russia from April to June of 1941, with the result that the Germans found themselves stalled outside Moscow in the middle of the bitter Russian winter. That precious time and the subsequent siphoning of 30 sorely needed Axis divisions to keep the Yugoslavs quiet plus the lend lease from the Allies, was the saving grace of a nation whose salvation was of questionable usefulness to the world.

Third – He was a bulwark to the British in their North African Campaign. With Europe occupied, the Germans were able to turn their attention to the Italian war effort in North Africa. In June 1942 Rommel and his Africa Korps in a long counter offensive against Ritchie, had captured Tobruk with 25,000 and pushed on within 70 miles of Alexandria. Auchinleck replaced Ritchie, with Cunningham and Tedder commanding sea and air components. There was no cause for British optimism as the build-up of her ground and air had been seriously influenced by her disastrous campaign in Greece which had cost her 50,000 men.
Mihailovich was asked to harass the Germans in this area and retard the flow of supplies through the Vardar Valley to Salonika. How well he did this was attested to by radio messages from Auchinleck, Cunningham and Tedder on 16 August 1942.
By October Allied reinforcements swelled the British command in North Africa sufficiently to permit Montgomery to match strength with Rommel in El Alamein. With the Allied landing in French North Africa on 8 November the Axis were through in Africa.
During this period Mihailovich suffered 20,000 casualties stopping the German supply route, and on 16 December 1942, 2500 hostages were executed by the Nazis in Belgrade.

These are debts of Britain and her Allies! To Mihailovic not Tito.

Secrets of War - The Balkan Tinderbox

This part of the Documentry "Secrets of War - The Balkan Tinderbox" on the History channel shows that Draza's Cetniks were more successful in fighting the Axis forces then the Partizans before the Allies switched support. It also shows how Communists distorted British intelligence to make the Partizans look better. It just goes to show that Mihajlovic was fighting the Nazi's contrary to Tito's propaganda after the war. The myth that Cetniks were just hiding in the woods singing songs and drinking while the Germans and Ustase were killing people is all a lie. And that Mihajlovic only fought the nazi's in 1941 and then joined them is an even bigger lie. Sure some groups that also called themselves Cetniks were allied with the Nazi's (Pecanac's Cetniks etc) but they were enemies of Mihajlovic.

What Tito didnt want you to see

Propaganda book portraying Cetniks as collaborators. Here on the front page on the right and left sides, German officers are supposedly standing besides Cetniks, in addition to Germans crouching in the front row.

No German officers. That photo was taken with rescued American pilots

Hidden photos of Communists colluding with Germans.


March 1943

Germans launch reprisals, killing Serbian civilians due to Draza's attacks on the occupiers. Dated 1943.

German propaganda paper declares Draza Mihajlovic an enemy of the Serbian people, announcing that all Chetnik prisoners and sympathizers of Draza are to be executed. Dated 1943.
Retaliation for resistance

In 1943, the Nazis issued a standing offer for the capture of General Draza Mihailovich, dead or alive. The reward was 100,000 gold Reichsmarks. The Germans did not succeed.

Veterans share WW2 survival and rescue story

Quote from the book "The Forgotten 500" describing OSS agent Arthur Jubilians first meeting with General Draza Mihajlovic:

"In the Serb fashion that they were getting used to, the village erupted into jubilant celebration with plum brandy and music, capped by a visit from Mihailovich himself. Jubilian was in awe at the already legendary General, feeling awkward in front of the charasmatic leader, especially because the OSS was so informal, with little attension to military protocol. He almost never saluted his OSS officers, but Jubilian felt that he was an enlisted man in the presence of a famous Serbian general, so he snapped off a sharp salute when introduced to Mihailovich. The young American was pleased to find out that despite his reputation as a fierce guerilla leader, Mihailovich was down to earth as anyone he had ever met. Like every other American who met Mihailovich personally, however, Jubilian was taken by the way a man of such simplicity could at the same time give such an impression of grandeur. Jubilian and the other Allied soldiers were most impressed by Mihailovich's sense of dignity in the face of extreme hardship and insurmountable odds, and the humble way he recieved accolades from his followers, consistently coming away with the same unshakable impression that they were standing in the presence of greatness. More than one airman reported that meeting with Mihailovich actually made them feel physically small, though Mihailovich was merely of average height and build. Mihailovich was known to be even-tempered for the most part, despite his recent outburst about the British, and though he was not necessarily considered a great intellect by most of his peers, his sense of duty to his country and his people was unquestioned. He was a man of great warmth and personality, kindly and paternal to everyone around him, though he was also a strict disciplinarian with his troops. Mihailovich was renowned for his simplicity, his insistence that he be one with the common people, never above them or his soldiers. He always preferred eating a meal on the ground with his troops to sitting inside a dining room with other officers, and everyone around him knew that his greatest joy was to live among the common people in their own communities - eating with them, dancing, joining in their festivals, singing folk songs and playing a guitar. He dressed as his soldiers dressed, ate what they ate, and refused anything that even implied a privileged status. His followers loved him for it and commonly called him Chicha, the Serbian word for uncle. The Americans saw Mihailovich best whenever the local villagers came to see him, always bringing gifts of wine and flowers, the women eager to kiss him on the cheek and pose for a picture with the general. Mihailovich was extremely fond of children, and whenever he passed through villagers the schoolmaster would declare a holiday so the children could swarm Mihailovich, eager to touch the hero. Mihailovich often would tease the boys in the group by saying he had heard that one of them was a Partisan and then ask which was loyal to Tito "Ne ja, Chicha!" Not I, Uncle! each boy would yell in return. Mihailovich continued teasing them, eyeing them suspiciously, pointing to first one and then another, saying "I have definate information. It is you?" The boys would continue laughing and yelling "Ne ja, Chicha!" untill finally Mihailovich relented and patted the boys on the back, saying, "i see you're all good Serbs. I shall have to tell my intelligence that they were wrong." The stories Jibilian had heard of Mihailovich were confirmed when he saluted the general and recieved a salute in return, then hung around for a while to exchange a few pleasantries and listen in as Mihailovich talked with Musulin and the other Americans about the upcoming rescue. Followers were always crowded around, seeking close proximity to this local celebrity, a celebrity without pretense who didnt mind a farmer suddenly giving him a bear hug and insisting on sharing a cup of plum brandy."

Newspaper articles from the WW2 era

Partizan collaboration

A German memorandum states that the German-Partisan conversation took place in Gornji Vakuf (west of Sarajevo) on March 11, 1943, from 9:30 to 11 A.M. . . . During the March discussions, the Partisan delegation stressed that the Partisans saw no reason for fighting the German Army - they added that they fought against German troops only in self-defense - but wished solely to fight the Chetniks; that they were oriented toward the propaganda of the Soviet Union only because they rejected any connection with the British; that they would fight the British should the latter land in Yugoslavia; that they did not intend to capitulate, but inasmuch as they wanted to concentrate on fighting the Chetniks, they wished to suggest respective territories of interest.

^A Communist Partisan officer, right, with German officers of the 7th SS Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen”.

The content of this German memorandum of conversation is confirmed by a document which the Partisan delegation left behind and which bears the signatures of the three Partisan emissaries. In it Djilas, Velebit and Popovic proposed not only further prisoner exchanges and German recognition of the right of the Partisans as combatants but, what was more important, the cessation of hostilities between German forces and the Partisans. The three delegates confirmed in writing that the Partisans ‘regard the Chetniks as their main enemy. . . A few days later, on March 17, the German Minister in Zagreb, Kasche, sent a telegram to Berlin in which, clearly referring to the German-Partisan talks, he reported the possibility ‘that Tito and supporters will cease to fight against Germany, Italy and Croatia and retire to the Sandzak in order to settle matters with Mihailovic’s Chetniks.’Meanwhile in the wake of the discussions between the three high Partisan representatives and Lieutenant General Dippold, further talks were arranged at Zagreb. . . . Velebit and Djilas passed again through the German lines and were brought by a German military plane from Sarajevo to Zagreb on March 25, 1943. There they had talks with Glaise von Horstenau and his staff.

Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Velebit met with German General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, above, in Zagreb.

Not having received a reply from Ribbentrop to his message of March 17, Kasche sent another telegram to his Foreign Minister on March 26, 1943, in which he reported that two duly authorized representatives of Tito had arrived in Zagreb for the purpose of discussions with German, Italian and Croatian military representatives. One of them, Kasche said, was Dr. Petrovic, a Croat, and the other a Montenegrin by the name of Markovic These people, he added, again offered to stop fighting if they could be left in peace in the Sandzak. . . .On March 29, Ribbentrop sent Kasche a telegram in which he prohibited all contact with the Partisans and asked on what Kasche based his optimism. . . .The discussions between the Partisan representatives and the Germans in Zagreb regarding a possible cessation of hostilities got nowhere, not only because the Partisan proposals were unacceptable to the Germans but, above all, because Berlin utterly opposed any accommodation with the Partisans. When apprised of the Zagreb contacts, Hitler reportedly said: ‘One does not negotiate with rebels - rebels must be shot.’”. . . . The fact remains, however, that the Partisans, who labeled Mihailovic and the Chetniks traitors for their accommodation with the enemy, sent two high-ranking officers to the German general in Zagreb with the purpose of arranging a cease-fire, after having declared in writing that their main enemies were the Chetniks and not the occupying Axis forces.No wonder that there is great sensitivity in Yugoslav Communist circles about that chapter in history. None of the official Yugoslav documents mentions the Velebit-Djilas trip to Zagreb, while every possible Chetnik Axis meeting is duly recorded.”Robert’s primary sources for these meetings and discussions between the Partisans and German forces concerning collaboration were based on the Nuremberg Armed Forces High Command document series which was assembled by prosecutors at the Nuremberg war crimes trials by the U.S. The document that disclosed the meeting was NOKW 1088, Record Group 238. The Communist dictatorship that Tito established after the war covered-up and suppressed this evidence of Communist Partisan collaboration with Nazi forces.

Communist mole and spy James Klugman falsified reports and data in support of the Communist Partisan forces of Tito, backed and supported by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union.Tito’s objective was thus to negotiate an end to hostilities and to combat between Communist Partisans and German occupation forces. The goal was to allow Tito to concentrate on destroying the Chetnik forces under Draza Mihailovich before a possible Allied landing that would allow a link up of Allied forces and Chetnik forces that would ensure Mihailovich’s victory in the civil war conflict in Yugoslavia. Mihailovich had not yet been completely abandoned and betrayed by the British and the U.S. Because the british and the U.S supported Mihailovich over the Communist Partisans, Tito and the Partisan leaders were willing to collaborate with the Nazis occupation forces and to engage in combat against British and U.S forces if doing so would allow them to prevent the Chetnik guerrilla movement from being recognized by the Allies.

Finally, the Communist Partisans “collaborated” with the Nazis from the time of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact from August 23, 1939. When Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, the Communist partizans did not resist the invasion. It was only when the Soviet Union was attacked on June 22, 1941, that the Partisans change this collaborationist policy. The decision to begin an armed struggle against the Nazi occupation forces was not made until a July 4, 1941 meeting held in Belgrade on 4 July 1941. The Communists celebrate the Day of Uprising on July 7, when a Communist murdered two Serbian officials. The Partizan resistance began with the murder of two Serbs, not with any resistance against Nazi troops. According to Djilas, in 1945 Communist partisan leaders decided that was it decided that July 7 should be the anniversary for the beginning of resistance, when shots were fired “at gendarmes and not at the Germans.” From April 6, 1941 to July 7, 1941, the Partizans collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces. Only when the Soviet Union was attacked were they reluctantly forced to began a resistance. Draza Mihailovich and the Chetnik forces, by contrast, had launched a resistance movement from the start of the German invasion of Yugoslavia.The documented proof that Tito’s Communist Partisans collaborated with the Nazis challenges the assumptions that the Partisans represented the popular will of the population of Yugoslavia and that they were an effective and viable resistance movement. The evidence of Partisan collaboration shows that the Communist Partisans were obsessed with achieving power and establishing a Soviet-style and Stalinist-style Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia at all costs and by whatever means necessary, even collaboration with German occupation forces. This evidence provides historical background and context on the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Military force, in the form of Soviet tanks and troops of the Red Army, put Tito into power in Belgrade. The bullet, not the ballot, established the Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia under Tito. Moreover, the rejection and betrayal of Allied ally Draza Mihailovich and the support of the Communist faction by the U.S. and Britain gave the Partisans the decisive advantage in the civil war conflict. This evidence supports the argument that foreign intervention in the Yugoslav conflict from 1941-1945, by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain, resulted in a Communist Partisan takeover of the Yugoslav government and the creation of a Communist dictatorship. Without this foreign intervention, the Communist Partisans were forced to collaborate with the Nazis because they faced defeat and loss in the conflict with Draza Mihailovich’s forces.

Secret OSS Document

Document from William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), stating that his intelligence unit in Yugoslavia personally observed Partizans attacking Chetniks while Chetniks were fighting Germans. It also says his men witnessed Partizans massacring civilians.

German letter of cooperation with the Partizans (translated)

Director O t t has said the following about his latest events/happenings with the Partizans.The last time I came across the partisans was on Good Friday in the middle of Rogoj behind Trnovo where the outposts of the 7th Bosnian Brigade fired at us. Dr.Petrovic then communicated with the Partizans and went with the Exchange Prisoner of War/captive Hertan Hass to the Command post where we then agreed that he shall inform/notify/give intelligence me about the Trnovo Command Post when he was finished with the sighting of the preyed Propaganda material of the Cetniks which he was willing to offer to me for in exchange for our positions. He was also willing to tell me when the final interview with Tito is going to take place. On Saturday after Easter I did receive the letter from Dr. Petrovic stating that the final interview was going to take place on may 10th between Kalinovik and Foca and he asked of me to bring the remaining Exchange Prisoners of war/captives to that place on that date. Ferner passed on to me two letters that I received, one from the German (something) General and the other from Mr. Ges…dten stating that the exchange of the Croatian captives/POWs shell be directed/organized by me so as such this matter could finally start flowing. After I received these letters I attempted via Gorazde to get in the lead with the Partizans who had already built a bridgehead south of Foca. That however did not work out due to the around roaming Cetniks. As a result the reclaiming of the propaganda material had to be left undone. In the meantime however during a drive to the coast I did deliver a letter to the Command Post next to Podgora at Biokovo saying that I wanted to get in contact with the there stationed dalmation Partizan commando.

Hitlers No.1 Headache!

Ronald Reagan on Mihajlovic

More laughable propaganda

Mihajlovic and American Colonel McDowell with a bunch of "Ustasa's". Its funny how they try to make out that Draza was allied with the Ustase.

They arent Ustase but Muslim Cetniks and a British officer..

* Mustafa Mulalic, Muslim Chetnik representative and member of the Central National Committee of the Yugoslav Royal Army in the Fatherland.
* Mustafa-beg Salihbegovic, Muslim Chetnik officer.
* Hasan-beg Muratbegovic, Muslim Chetnik officer.
* Robert H. McDowell, United States of America Colonel.
* Dragoljub "Draza" Mihailovic, the Chetniks' leader.
* Mustafa Pasic, Chetnik Muslim officer.
* Mahmud-beg Predjilovic, Chetnik Muslim officer.
* 1st Chetnik guard of Draza.
* 2nd Chetnik guard of Draza.
* British Royal Forces Officer that followed Colonal McDowell.

2 Muslim Cetniks in that pic are in this one with Draza aswell.

More Muslim Cetniks:

People ask why muslims fought for the Chetniks? Thinking that the Chetnik movement was a strictly pure Serbian movement. Fact is that Serbs were not the only ones welcome to join its ranks. Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Jews etc joined Chetniks ranks aswell. They were either anti-communists/royalists, or they just simply wanted to defend their homes against Nazi/Ustasa oppression.

Zvonimir "Feliks" Vuckovic. A Croat Chetnik, was one of Draza Mihajlovic's right hand men.

Slovenian "Blue Guard" Chetniks


Speech given in Canada in 1953
“There is no nation which would, more than you Serbs, appreciate human freedoms and rights. Not only appreciate, but give everything for them. It happened on Kosovo, the Salonika Front and Ravna Gora. The first thing that I learned from your brothers in your mountains was “Freedom or Death.” The great law and ideal for great men and times.
…I have not many opportunities to meet many great men. One of them is my good and never forgotten Chicha [General Mihailovich]. He will live in my heart as long as I last. I observed him in all conditions, mostly difficult ones. Then one can see better. It made no difference whether the gunpowder was burning the eyes, or death was waiting, or injustice was hurting. He was always great and sincere in victory as well as in defeat. He loved his country, his people and the cause of freedom, sacrificing himself for the glory of living…
Calm, courageous, and resourceful, during all operations from Ivanjica, Drina, Zlatibor, Valjevo and Sabac, he remained always legendary. I remember one night near Rudo, when a battle lasted three hours and the Germans were firing on us from all sides and from the air, Chicha went from one to another, from one part of the battlefield to another, bringing fate and force into our weakened bodies. To him we have to be grateful for breaking out of the encirclement. Yes, I might add, and for our lives. If there was no General I would not be alive today…
He spared innocent blood and avoided hopeless battles at all cost – although it is always easier to sacrifice others for one’s own glory, or build that glory on thousands of innocent and unneeded graves.
‘When the times of*general uprising comes,’ said Chicha, ‘we will give everything for freedom and victory. But, for that day we must be ready so that we can hit harder and win for sure. Before that day arrived they chose Tito. By such an act, they have sinned against God, faithfulness, justice, victory and freedom,’ Chicha declared.
During the very difficult winter of 1943, together, we were pushing to break out of the Valley of Death. Already the perspective was changing. The BBC glorified a man who had been sent to Yugoslavia to convert the liberation struggle into fratricidal war, and on the ruins of a state to build a Communist ‘Celekula’. [The Turkish Pasha of Nish, in 1809, had ordered that the heads of Serbian insurgents who had tried to liberate a town near Nish be shaved [Cele] and used to erect a tower [kula] as testimony to what happened if Turkish control was challenged in Serbia.] There is no cruel, dishonest, or bestial road that this Red monster did not take to to accomplish his task. The naïve Allies, to accommodate Stalin, nurtured a snake in their bosoms.
On his account fables were converted into history. Other people’s successes into his red feather. We were in Rogatica after Ostojic’s troops won the victory at Visegrad. That same night the BBC gave our victory to Tito and announced that victorious Partisans had entered Rogatica. We, the Yugoslav Army of the Homeland, were in Rogatica. At that time, around the town there was not a single German or a Tito Commie.
When we parted after a brotherly hug, Chicha was smiling but his eyes were sad. We knew what kind of days were to follow.”

Captain Walter Mansfield
In a Speech given in Canada

American Military Forces treated as Prisoners by Tito's Partisans

^ Lt. Col. James M. Inks, United States Air Force
July 13, 1946

Dear Lt. Inks:

I have learned that you parachuted from your plane on the 28th of July, 1944, near Podgorica, Yugoslavia and that you were liberated by the Partisans April 26, 1945, and returned to your base. As the military attaché to the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, your experiences and impressions regarding this matter, interest me very much and I would appreciate it very much if you would inform me in detail about your experience. I am especially interested in your impressions of our units and the various parts of the country through which you passed, their treatment towards you, what observations you can make concerning the enemy and how you happened to be liberated by the Partisans and returned to your authorities. I would like to know how you were received by the various units in Yugoslavia and how they treated you.
Anticipating a quick reply to my inquiries, accept my sincerest regards and my congratulations on your safe return to your home and to your loved ones after all you have gone through in this horrible war.
Sincerely yours,

Colonel Mihovil Tartalja, Military and Air Attache, Yugoslav Embassy.
July 17, 1946
Colonel Mihovil Tartalja Military and Air Attache Yugoslav Embassy
Colonel Tartalja:
At dawn this morning, 17 July 1946, the Partisans took the life of the greatest man yet to show his face in the political situation of Yugoslavia. Yes, General Mihailovich was truly a great man. His honesty, integrity and straight-forwardness was in direct contract to the slinky and crafty Partisans that I was unfortunate enough to come in contact with.
I am writing this at your request, and my views are my own and are not to be interpreted as to represent those of the army or my government, however, you can rest assured that I am going to do my utmost to expose this monstrosity of a crime that your government has just this morning committed.
I spent months in Yugoslavia and came in contact with all of the factions there. I lived with General Mihailovich for three months and learned a great deal about the man and his ways of accomplishing things. I jumped in the same fox-holes with his Chetniks, when American and English planes bombed and strafed them on Tito’s information that Germans were there. True, the Chetniks were not openly fighting the Germans in the last year of the war, but they were powerless to do so. However I witnessed and took part in numerous skirmishes with the Germans, which we were forced to give the Partisans credit for.
As for the treatment by the different groups, the Chetniks treated us like free men and allies. They gave us food that should have normally gone to their underfed troops. They gave us guns and ammunition and money and allowed us to do just about anything we were physically able to. After we were captured by the Partisans, we were treated as prisoners and certainly not like allies. They took our guns and ammunition from us, kept us with their prisoners, and even forced us to carry wounded Partisans off the field of battle under fire.
I kept an accurate account of what happened to me and my comrades while we were in Yugoslavia. This has recently had its secret classification removed by the army and is now cleared for publication. I hope in the near future to have it before every citizen in the United States, in one of our popular magazines and you can rest assured that I will leave nothing out that reflects my contempt for your present form of Government. Furthermore, several hundred other American airmen are not going to forget General Mihailovich and I sincerely hope that we see to it that you are reminded forcefully of the supreme injustice that you have committed against him.

Captain, Air Corps U.S.

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Inks of the United States Air Force flew 135 combat missions during twenty years of his distinguished military service. His Liberator bomber was forced to go down in Yugoslavia in July of 1944 as he was flying his 43rd mission, last mission during World War II. Inks and his fellow airmen would stay in Yugoslavia for 10 ½ months after being rescued by the Chetniks. He witnessed firsthand what was going on in Yugoslavia as he traveled with the Chetniks. Three of those 10 ½ months were spent directly with General Mihailovich near Loznica. Lt. Col. Inks would learn much about both the General and his forces and kept a diary during his time in Yugoslavia. This diary would later be published in book form in 1954. Eight Bailed Out, published by W.W. Norton & Company, New York, is the story of an American airman’s experience in World War II Yugoslavia among the people who were fighting not just for their lives against the Axis occupier but for the integrity and future of their nation after the war.

Hitler & Himler issue orders to destroy Mihailovic

'Having in view the danger contained in the Mihailovich movement, I have already, in anticipation of all eventualities, issued orders for the destruction of all his supporters on the territory occupied by my troops. The liquidation of Mihailovich's movement at the present time will no longer be an easy matter because of the forces he has at his disposal.' (February 16, 1943)

"The basis of every success in Serbia and in the entire southeast of Europe lies in the annihilation of Mihailovich. Concentrate all your forces on locating Mihailovich and his headquarters so that he can be destroyed. Any means may be used to achieve this end. I expect the smoothest cooperation between all agencies concerned, from the Security Police and Security Service to all other branches of the SS and police. The head of the SS and police Meissner has already received instructions from me in this regard. Please let me know which clues we already have of Mihailovich’s whereabouts. Please inform me weekly about the progress of this action."

Heinrich Himmler, Nazi Commander of the SS and Gestapo, July 17, 1942.

American Airmen testimonies

On May 13, 1946, the Committee for a Fair Trial for General Mihailovich announced that a Commission of Inquiry had been established in New York for the purpose of taking testimonies of American officers and airmen whose request to be heard as witnesses at the trial of General Draza Mihailovich in Belgrade, Yugoslavia had been refused by the Tito government.
Here are some quotes from the testimonies of:
Nick Lalich

Q. You had your own radio station?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Shortly before September 10th was your radio station attacked by anybody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. By whom?
A. My radio station was attacked by the Partisans, a trio.
Q. You mean three Partisans?
A. Yes, three Partisans who ventured into General Mihailovich’s area. They had gotten information that a radio station was in that general vicinity, and Americans operating it evidently and they attacked it.
Q. Did they wreck it?
A. No, they did not wreck my radio or damage it, but I did see bullet marks and scars on the fence that went around my place.
Q. How do you know they were Partisans?
A. Because later that evening that same trio hit the town of Pranjani and attacked the town commandant. That was while I was sleeping in the town, by the way.
Q. Do you mean the commandant was a Chetnik?
A. Yes, I got up quickly and rushed into the street, wanting to find out what was going on, but they had left. This home was damaged, doors were knocked out, windows smashed, and the town commandant had escaped. His name was Markovich. There is no doubt in my mind that it was Partisans. The people also told me that it was Partisans. They were very much frightened.
Q. And none were captured?
A. That is right, none were captured, although they captured my guard, one of my guards.
Q. You mean the Partisans captured one of our guards?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any Germans in that vicinity?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you send in an official report of the incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you based that on what you heard?
A. Yes, sir. I explained it. By the way, my guard was returned, and he told me that they were Partisans, that they were wearing the red star on their caps.
Q. Do you know why your guard was returned?
A. He told me that they were going to kill him, but he was returned. They wanted information from him, and he gave them some, but there was not anything relating to Americans. He was returned two days later.
Q. Returned or escaped?
A. He told me he escaped. He fled from the home where they had him tied up.
BY MR. CHANDLER: Q. You left Pranjani about when?
CAPTAIN NICK A. LALICH: A: The night of September 10th, exactly at eight o’clock.
Q. Under what circumstances did you leave?
A. Well, at that time, I would say three or four days earlier, there was much shooting in the general vicinity, we could hear machine guns and mortars, and things were getting pretty hot. The Partisan army had penetrated in force across the Drina River and on into Maljen Mountains. And at the same time the Russians had reached the Danube River. So we started to move north, and our ultimate destination, according to General Mihailovich, was to penetrate north and over into eastern Bosnia, to the high mountain area, for a winter retreat.
Q. Am I right in saying that you left the Pranjani area because the Partisans attacked it?
A. Yes.
Q. And where did you go from there?
A. I moved north across the Valjevo-Belgrade railway. We crossed that railway at night three days later.
Q. Did you move because the Partisans were attacking the headquarters or because there was fear of an attack?
A. They were attacking the headquarters, I know that definitely.
Q. Did you have any discussions at that time with General Mihailovich about the state of the war or his strategic plans?
A. Yes, sir, many discussions. We talked about the war and America, and the future of Yugoslavia, and in fact we even talked about Paris, France, New York, different places of interest.
Q. What did General Mihailovich have to say about his plans for the war?
A. Well, he realized that he had two enemies; he had the Germans and the Partisans to fight. In fact he told me he had no more aid but God, but he would get along somehow.
Q. He said he would go on fighting the Germans?
A. Yes, sir, he did. In fact I asked him, “Why don’t you come out with me when I am ready to go home?” He said, “No, I have fought for four years and I will stay with my people and fight to the end.”
BY MR. HAYS: Did he [General Mihailovich] say why the Partisans were his enemies?
Q. What did he say about that?
A. He said that they had different ideals, that their ideals were communistic and his were democratic, he had democratic processes, and he believed in the things we believed in; and in fact he compared America with his way of life.
Q. Did he talk of any attempts to collaborate with the Partisans, unitedly, so that they would both fight the Germans.
A. He said they tried to get together, and in fact all parties were invited to fight the enemy, that is the Germans, and they had these meetings and the plans were laid to attack different areas and towns; one in particular was Valjevo. And in attacking Valjevo they were supposed to hit together, but the Chetniks hit, and the Partisans hit them from the rear. This was all according to General Mihailovich. That was one reason.
And they had another outbreak of a similar nature in the Visegrad area. In fact at one time they rode the same tanks into the village of Cacak with red stars and the double eagle painted on these tanks. So it seemed they could not get together, and the break came and they separated.
Q. Did you get any idea of how much of his time was spent fighting the Germans and how much of his time was spent fighting the Partisans?
A. Yes, sir, they fought the Germans when I was in the Sarajevo area. It seemed to me that they would hit the Germans especially when they knew ammunition and guns were being carried, and vital supplies. I happened to be there when they attacked near Visegrad, a road running between Visegrad and Sarajevo, a German column moving in there, and they attacked and came out with two truckloads of ammunition and guns. This ammunition was brought up into my area.
Q. Were you there when any action took place against the Partisans?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. In fact, I witnessed a battle. I did not see the fight man-to-man, but I witnessed a battle in the area of Tuzla at the town of Puracic.
Q. You saw that battle through your field glasses?
A. Yes, sir, I witnessed that from the distance of about two or two-and-a-half kilometers. We were up on a mountain top with seven airmen who were with me, my radio operator and one guide and myself. Two Moslems arrived wearing the typical Moslem dress; I questioned them and they said the Chetniks were battling the Partisans down in the valley, and I could see the smoke if the mortars.
We moved along, coming to the area of Boljanic. We also witnessed prisoners from that battle, 37 to be exact.
Q. 37 Partisans?
A. 37 Partisan prisoners. They arrived barefooted, very poorly clothed, and they were wearing the red star.
Q. Did you personally question them?
A. Yes.
Q. What did they tell you?
A. I asked them what was their reason for fighting the Chetniks, and they told me that they were forced to fight. Well, I asked them what they meant. They said, well, they have to come into our homes, and at the point of*gun we went to battle. 32 of these men were Moslems and 5 of them were Serbians. I took pictures of them. I do not have them with me.
BY MR. CHANDLER: During your period in Yugoslavia I think you told us at the beginning you were on the lookout for any evidence of collaboration, because you had been told to be on the lookout?
A. That is right.
Q. That rumors of collaboration had come back to Cairo?
A. That is right, sir, and back to Bari, too.
Q. You carried out that mission, and your eyes were open for that sort of thing?
A. Yes, sir. I was able to speak the language and I could understand the language; and living in Mihailovich’s house, right in his headquarters, from November 1st to December 11th, when I left General Mihailovich in the Sarajevo district, I had an opportunity to listen and talk, and during all that time I did not see any signs of collaboration or any talking of collaboration, and I was listening for it and trying to detect anything of that nature I could. It interested me very much. I was the last one there after Colonel McDowell left, and I had the opportunity of reading many, many messages coming out of Yugoslavia as the assistant operations officer at Bari, Italy.
Q. Did you file reports that you found no evidence of collaboration?
A. Yes, sir, I filed reports with the State Department and with the OSS.
Q. I think in the last few questions and answers you said that during the period you lived with General Mihailovich, November and December, you saw no signs of collaboration of any kind?
A. That is right, sir.
Q. Is the same thing true as to the rest of the period that you were in Yugoslavia?
A. Yes, positively.
Q. You would say that from this period of August to December, 1944, if there had been any collaboration, in view of the freedom which was allowed you, you would have been bound to know about it?
A. Positively.
Q. What was the purpose of this trip, this 500-mile trip that you have been talking about?
A. The Partisans were trying to capture General Mihailovich and trying to get the American mission out of Yugoslavia.
Q. And did all of them make this 500-mile trip, all the Chetniks.
A. So many troops would go forward with us maybe for a month, and then we would pick up other troops in eastern Bosnia; because they had large concentrations of troops in different areas.
Before I went to Yugoslavia, after reading all of the reports and having access to all the information from Yugoslavia, I always believed that eastern Bosnia—in fact when you mentioned the word Bosnia to me, I always felt that that was a Partisan stronghold; but that was not true. When I entered eastern Bosnia there were thousands of troops waiting for General Mihailovich.
Q. So this trip that you are talking about was largely an attempt to get away from Partisan threats?
A. Yes, sir.
^ The Halyard Mission Team confers with General Mihailovich, August 1944. Lt. Nick A. Lalich is standing in the center. To his right is General Mihailovich and to his left is Captain George Musulin.

^Captain Nick A. Lalich, left, with General Draza Mihailovich, center, and O.S.S. Radioman Arthur Jibilian, right, preparing to say Good-bye, December 1944, in Bosnia.

^ Captain Nick A. Lalich and General Draza Mihailovich sharing a light moment in September of 1944.


Q. Tell us in your own words what happened to you when you finally landed in Yugoslavia.
A. Well, we bailed out at 16,000 feet, and I delayed my jump for fear that the fighter planes might attack us. And when I hit the ground there were about 15 or 20 Chetniks waiting for me. They had seen my parachute open and were waiting on the ground to pick me up. In the distance I heard a few shots, and we started to run for cover. They told me that a few Germans had followed our descent down and were trying to get us. So we took cover in the hills. And then I was taken to Colonel Dragisa Vasic’s headquarters.
Q. Who was Colonel Vasic?
A. Colonel Vasic was a well-known writer and lawyer in Belgrade.
Q. Was he a member of Mihailovich’s Army?
Q. Yes, he was. I believe he was the corps commander in the Chetnik area that I dropped in. [Editor’s note: D. Vasic was a reserve officer and political adviser to Mihailovich, not a corps commander.]
Q. Tell us what happened there.
A. Well, he greeted me very warmly; we sat down and had a drink, slivovitz.
Q. What happened to you that first night in Yugoslavia, do you remember?
A. The first night I was there I was taken to a farmhouse and given a large bed all to myself, and I was assured by the interpreter, who was a Chetnik, that I could sleep soundly and that there was no fear of Germans, that I should not fear the Germans because they posted a 10-man guard outside of my house. And they told me that should the occasion arise where the Germans would be in the vicinity they would awaken me immediately.
Q. That 10-man guard consisted of Chetnik soldiers, did it not?
A. Yes, sir. I awoke the next morning and looked outside my door, and these 10 men were huddled together outside in the pouring rain. And I asked them how come that they had not come inside the hut for shelter, and they told me that they were afraid that they might awaken me if they did come in, and that according to Mihailovich’s orders they were never supposed to leave any Americans unprotected.
Q. Did you see any evidence of collaboration between the German occupation troops and the Chetniks during the whole period you were in Yugoslavia?
A. During my entire stay in Yugoslavia I never at any time did see any signs of collaboration.
Q. Tell us in your own words what General Mihailovich said and what happened when he was at that place.
A. Well, at first he came up on the field with his staff and he stood in the center of the field and he shook hands with each and every one of the 200 Americans. And if one of the boys happened to speak French he carried on a lengthy conversation with that individual, because he spoke fluent French, but no English. And he signed our short-snorters; and we asked him to pose for photographs, and he posed for photographs with almost every one of the boys there.
After this more or less individual reception that he granted each and every one of us he put on a display of strength more or less of all his troops, and I would say there were about 400 soldiers participating in this review and about a thousand soldiers watching the review.
Q. Did General Mihailovich himself say anything to you to the other American airmen there assembled?
A. After this particular review we all adjourned to the side of the airfield, and we all sat underneath a large shady tree, and Mihailovich sat at the center of the group, and all the American airmen assembled around Mihailovich. And a few feet away from Mihailovich stood the interpreter, and Mihailovich spoke to the interpreter, and he translated to us. First, Mihailovich started off by welcoming us to Yugoslavia. And then he apologized for the poor conditions with which he welcomed us and the inconvenience we had to endure while there. After which he gave us a brief history of Yugoslavia, starting with the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany, and the way he took his staff and fled to the hills to carry on his fight for freedom, and “never to surrender” in his words. And the way they carried on sabotage activities against the Germans.
Well, he mentioned the fact that the only thing that kept him from waging a large scale attack against he Germans is the fact that his equipment is very poor and that he has not been given any equipment, and if he did have the proper equipment he would be able to carry on much stronger attacks against the Germans.
Then he started to praise the American government, and he said he had always believed in democracy and he always looked highly at the American government.
And in closing he told us that he will try his utmost to get us back to our bases as soon as possible to resume our fight against the enemy.
He said, “After the war you can all go back to your great land, our great country,” and he said, “The Serbian people and myself have considered it a great honor to be of assistance to you.”

^ A tearful first meeting between Richard Felman and Misha Stefanovich from Cacak, the son of the Chetnik corporal who saved his life over 50 years ago. After the war, the Communists killed Stefanovich’s father for allegedly turning Felman over to the Germans.

Lt. John Devlin

Q. How many Partisans were there in the band that picked you up?
A. I would say about 25.
Q. And you had just one Chetnik guide?
A. Yes, we had just one Chetnik guide.
Q. Who was taken into custody and you never saw him again?
A. No, we never saw him again.
Q. What did they do to you or to your party?
A. They immediately took us under escort; we had lost our interpreter; I could speak a little Serbian.
Q. And who was your interpreter?
A. Bobby Musulin.
Q. What became of him?
A. He refused to go on this journey with us, he wanted to stay with the Chetniks.
Q. So he had not been with you?
A. He had not been with us from the time we left Nevesinje.
Q. Go ahead.
A. We attempted to ask where we were going, and they said we were going to headquarters. They took us to headquarters and we met a major general there—we met so many darn generals there, they had quite a few in their army.
Q. How far away was headquarters?
A. This was 3 o’clock, and we arrived there about 9; it was about a 6 hour march. There they had a Yugoslav who could speak English, and he questioned us to a great extent on Chetnik activities. Of course they realized that we had been with the Chetniks. He questioned us to great length about Chetnik activities, and none of us would reveal anything. Then we were housed, we were told to shave—several of us had beards, which was the custom in Serbia—and we were told to immediately shave. And I refused to shave because I wanted to bring my beard back to Italy and get a few pictures taken. I was told in very strong language that I had better shave. So, not to antagonize anybody, I and the other members of the crew shaved. We were housed with the soldiers; in fact during our stay of 2 weeks with the Partisans we were always housed with the military.
Q. Did you ever go out somewhere else?
A. That was impossible.
Q. How do you mean it was impossible?
A. We were not allowed. If we stopped to have food the peasants were told to get out, and they brought food in to us, and then if we moved our quarters anywhere for the night the peasants were told to get out of the house. We were never separated.
Q. You were never allowed to talk to any people freely?
A. No; I was sorry about that, that I never had the opportunity to talk to the people.[/i]
[i]Q. Did you see any of these Chetniks leave that town to go on any mission?
A. Yes, several times that is where they would start from, they would gather at Pranjani and we would see them prepare to leave, and they would march off singing; they had a favorite song “Spremte se Spremte Chetnici.”
Q. Do you have any information of what the purpose of the mission was?
A. To aid other areas, other corps areas, who were being attacked either by the Germans or the Partisans. I must be honest, I take it sometimes by the Germans and sometimes by the Partisans.
Q. Did any of these men come back to the place so you had an opportunity to hear their story?
A. Yes, they lived in the vicinity, some of them.
Q. Some of them?
A. Yes.
Q. Did any of them tell you whether they were off on activities either against the Partisans or the Germans?
A. Yes, some of them boasted of activities on both sides. They boasted of derailing a train and of robbing a train, and they also boasted of clashes they had had with the Partisans, but they were fighting with both elements.
Q. When you speak of robbing a train you are referring to Germans?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know of any instances where the Partisans attacked the Chetniks?
A. That seemed to be a constant thing. The Chetniks had to remain on the defense because of lack of equipment

^ German supply train derailed by Serbian Chetnik Forces during WWII.

Captain George S. Musulin

Q. Tell us in your own way juts where you went, who you saw and what you did during this period of your inspection.
A. It happened that on November 26th—it was Thanksgiving Day if I recall—and Mihailovich in respect to this great American holiday was going to put on a display of his strength. This display was to take place in all the areas that were under his control. And large bonfires were to be built on the mountain-top, and he had sent a telegram to Cairo prior to Thanksgiving asking American planes to come over the area and see for themselves the extent of the territory that was under his control. We sent to the little town of Konjusa [pronounced Kohn-yushah], which happened to be Colonel Seitz’s headquarters at that time. We had a very good turkey dinner; I do not know where they got the turkey, but we had two turkeys for the occasion. And we were very enthusiastically received, and we had to speak before the different members of Mihailovich’s staff, the local staff, and we came in contact with the people, who asked hundreds of questions, most of them pertaining to the war and America’s part in it, etc.; I mean generally speaking about the war conditions in Europe at that time.
During this inspection tour we had seen many thousands of Chetnik troops, most of them were ill clad, many of them were barefooted, they had primitive arms, they did not have any ammunition to speak of, they were suffering from diseases due to malnutrition, it was easy to see a lot of skin diseases because of unhygienic conditions that they were living under; and it was a very poor, poor-looking army; but they were strong in morale and weak in material.
Q. Did you have occasion to observe just how the Chetnik Army was organized?
A. Yes, it seems to me that the Chetnik army was composed of two groups; they had any active standing army which was composed of about sixty to seventy thousand members constantly under arms that could be called upon in case of an emergency in any part of Yugoslavia. The other part of Mihailovich’s army was a territorial army composed of peasants who lived on little farms, who worked their little farms, and were a potential strength in Mihailovich’s army. I would say this potential would be anywhere from two hundred to three hundred thousand men. Mihailovich only kept enough men under arms to take care of an immediate emergency, and he allowed these territorials to go back and work their farms until the army would be able to have proper food or what food could be developed in the areas which they occupied; and in case of a total mobilization this territorial army would become a regular active army. There were no arms to speak of amongst this territorial army, there would be one rifle to ten men, or maybe less than that.
Q. During the course of this tour of inspection did you see any collaboration between the Germans and the Chetniks?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. And were you looking for such acts of collaboration?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. If there had been any in the area in which you were observing would you have seen it?
A. Yes, I believe I would have. I would like to enlarge upon that. We were instructed to see if there was any new material coming into the corps which we inspected. I mean in the way of arms and ammunition and medical supplies. That was one of the reasons for our tour, to find out if there were any German shipments of ammunition and medical supplies, and we failed to see any.
Q. You were looking for them?
A. Yes, sir, I was looking for them.
Q. And if they had been there you would have seen them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the purpose of the conference?
A. The purpose of the conference at that time was to ask General Mihailovich for help, material help, to destroy an antimony mine that was producing 75 to 100 tons of antimony-blend for the German war effort.
Q. What is antimony, do you know?
A. Antimony is a metal that is used in tempering steel for shells, bombs, etc.
Q. Where was this mine located?
A. This mine was located in Lisa, in the county of Dragacevo, which happened to be in my area of operation.
Q. Can you tell the Commission in a bit more detail what specific plans were discussed between you and General Mihailovich with relation to the destruction of that mine? And tell us first what you mean by destruction of the mine.
A. We were interested in putting the mine out of commission. You could not destroy the mine, it was almost impossible; what we wanted to do was to destroy the compressors, the smelt[er]s and the electrical equipment which helped to operate this mine and produce this antimony. Mihailovich told me that he would give me his fullest cooperation; and he also instructed me to contact a Captain Vuckovic, who would give me the necessary men to do the job. But before we could get into the antimony mine we had to destroy the garrison that was entrenched there.
Q. Was that a German garrison?
A. Yes, sir, a German garrison.
Q. Of how many men, do you know?
A. Our intelligence reports claimed that there were about 200 men in that area.
Q. Do you know what personnel was operating the mine?
A. Native personnel was operating the mine under more or less instructions by the Germans, the German military command.
Q. When Mihailovich told you that he would give you the necessary men and personnel to carry out this operation, what did he mean? Did he tell you that he would give you Chetnik military personnel?
A. He told me that he would give me all the soldiers in his forces that were necessary to knock that mine out of commission.
Q. How many soldiers did you estimate were necessary?
A. I felt with the arms that we had and the arms that we probably could get through Allied sources we would need about 100 well-equipped Chetniks to do the job.
Q. And General Mihailovich assured you of that number of men?
A. He assured me of any number that I would desire.
Q. You proceeded on the assumption that one Chetnik could take care of two Germans entrenched?
A. Well, I felt that if we had mortars and bazookas we could reduce the garrison with 100 men who were excellent guerrilla fighters.
Q. The Germans I suppose did not have any heavy guns or ammunition?
A. I do not think so; they had machine guns and rifles, and they depended more on the stronger garrisons in the vicinity like Belgrade and Cacak [pronounced Chaa-Chaak] that could reinforce that garrison if necessary.
Q. And the bulk of Mihailovich’s forces were where?
A. His strength seemed to be in Serbia, eastern Bosnia, with elements in Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro; but his strength was in Serbia, his main strength, the disposition of his troops.
Q. Did you ever talk with General Mihailovich about the destruction of other targets?
A. Yes, I talked to General Mihailovich about all the targets in the area in which I was operating as liaison officer that could be used for eventual sabotage.
Q. What sort of targets to do you refer to?
A. I refer to targets such as railroads, bridges, roads, garrisons, ammunition dumps, and airfields and other targets of military nature.
Q. What did those security measures consist of?
A. Those security measures consisted of 30 or 40 armed men.
Q. Chetnik soldiers?
A. Yes, Chetnik soldiers. We would pack the supplies up in the mountains that were not very easily accessible, and to transport these airmen to areas of safety in case there was any danger in that area. They lived off the land, and the people gave up their beds, they gave us the food they had, which was not very much, corn bread and cheese and some potatoes and things like that, but it was the best they had.
Q. Did soldiers or officers acting under the direct orders from General Mihailovich keep a constant surveillance over these American and Allied airmen who were awaiting evacuation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was it the purpose of that to keep them out of the hands of the Germans?
A. That is right.
Q. To your knowledge did that surveillance ever fail?
A. It never failed, because we had never lost a man to the Germans at that time.
Q. Did General Mihailovich receive any compensation in any form, shape or manner for this work?
A. He did not receive anything in return for this work, and we told him that he could not expect to receive anything for that work.
He felt that he was an Ally, and that his contribution was saving these airmen to go back to their bases and go out and fight the enemy again.
Q. You mean he conveyed that to you, when you say he felt that?
A. He felt that he was doing one of his duties when he sent these airmen back to Italy
Q. Now, Captain, in the spring of 1944 did the Partisans attack the Chetniks within your territory?
A. In the spring of 1944 they made determined efforts to get into Serbia. These attempts came from the area of Guca [pronounced Goo-Cha] and Ivanjica [pronounced Eva-nee-tsa].
Q. Tell us what you observed, if anything, in connection with the Partisan offensive.
A. Well, during this period I got malaria and I was not very active for about a month, but I was getting intelligence reports from Mihailovich’s corps commanders which I was sending to the headquarters about this fight. I did not witness the fighting myself.
Q. As the result of the reports which came to you in your official capacity as American liaison officer in that area what observations did you make?
A. The observation that I made, which I thought was a very significant one, was that during these operations we would plot the activities of the Partisan troops on the map, and we found that they had been avoiding German garrisons in order to get at the Chetniks.
Q. You stated that when you were over there one of your duties was to find out if there was any collaboration. Did you other than by mere observation make a special effort to inquire into that?
A. Yes, I did. I made special attempts to find out in what form this collaboration was taking place.
Q. And what method did you pursue to find that out, merely talking to Mihailovich and officers, or did you do anything else?
A. I talked to the peasantry that I met and I have talked to officers. And I did know that there was some setup, that was told to me, there was some setup of obtaining ammunition and arms, whatever method they could get.
Q. I would like to know what you did find along that line. To whom did you talk about possible collaboration? Who said anything about it? What was the explanation of it, and things of that sort?
A. Well, I talked directly to General Mihailovich about these accusations directed against him.
Q. And what did he say?
A. He said only a fool could believe those accusations. He said, “After the death of one hundred thousand Serbs during the reprisal measures of 1941, 1942 and 1943 how could I ever do any work among the Germans and still remain a loyal subject of my people?”
Q. What did he say about Tito and his relations with Tito and the fighting with Tito?
A. The fighting against Tito was very bitter, there had been a pool of blood between the two groups. I asked Mihailovich what he thought could be done to avoid this clash between his troops and Partisan troops.
Q. Did he say anything about how the differences between himself and Tito occurred, as to who started the fighting?
A. Well, he accused Tito of attacking him during the early days of 1941 while they had been collaborating together against the activities of the Germans. But Mihailovich proposed to me, seeing that this civil war was just helping the Germans—he proposed to me a plan, and the plan was supposed to have been this, that the British, the Russians and the Americans should send a commission to his headquarters, and that a commission composed of the same elements be sent into Tito’s headquarters, and this commission with his help could set up zones of operation where they would receive material help and aid from the Allies to use it in the common effort against the Germans. In this way he felt that this commission would prevent a clash between the Chetniks and the Partisans.
Q. Now the Chetniks and the Partisans in general in most instances were in different parts of Yugoslavia, were they not?
A. That is right.
Q. And what was the occasion, if you knew, that would bring them into a clash?
A. Well, it seemed that during this period of time that I had spent in Yugoslavia, it seems that the Partisans wanted to take over the territory that was under the control of General Mihailovich and his officers.

^ Captain George S. Musulin in Chetnik headgear during his first mission to Mihailovich's forces in 1943

^ General Draza Mihailovich with Captain George S. Musulin 1944

^ Gathering at Pranjani Air Strip in Serbia 1944 for the evacuation of American and Allied Airmen by the Mihailovich forces.