Tuesday, July 7, 2009

More Documents & posters

Chetnik declaration of the 1941 uprising against the occupier

Since the German offensive on Ravna Gora called "Operation Mihailovich" in december 1941 failed, the Germans put a bounty on Draza Mihailovic's head.

One of the few saved orders of Major Dragutin Keserovic, to destroy bridges and railway tracks to further weaken the German war machine

German propaganda poster attempting to turn the Serbian population against General Draza Mihailovic

German propaganda poster attempting to turn the Serbian people against General Draza Mihailovic. This one says "Draza Mihailovic - Gravedigger of the Serbian people"

German declaration against the Chetniks

German papers against Chetniks and Chetnik supporters aswell as Communists

Serbian David vs Nazi Goliath

Chetnik aid to Russia

Tito's democracy
"Shall this be Mihailovic's monument?"

David O'Connell. An American airman who was rescued by the Chetniks. His sign says it all.

Monday, March 9, 2009

The Three Things That Must Be Considered in Evaluating The Greatness of Mihajlovic

By Lt. Col. Albert B. Seitz
There remains little for the physical record of Draza Mihailovic; sparkplug of resistance; abandoned Minister of War to the throne of Yugoslavia.
On April 18, 1946 a news item appeared in Il Giornale della Sera in Rome from an unidentified Yugoslav source. It reported that on 13 March, after a sustained air-ground attack, in which poison gas was used, Mihailovic had been captured with eleven living followers. They were all that remained of a force of 1020 men. He became a martyr in July.
Three things must be considered in evaluating the greatness of Mihailovich.

First - He set the example for Europe and its conquered people in resistance.

Second - He was of incalculable benefit to Russia in defeating Germany. His revolt at Ravna Gora caused Hitler to delay his time table of attack on Russia from April to June of 1941, with the result that the Germans found themselves stalled outside Moscow in the middle of the bitter Russian winter. That precious time and the subsequent siphoning of 30 sorely needed Axis divisions to keep the Yugoslavs quiet plus the lend lease from the Allies, was the saving grace of a nation whose salvation was of questionable usefulness to the world.

Third – He was a bulwark to the British in their North African Campaign. With Europe occupied, the Germans were able to turn their attention to the Italian war effort in North Africa. In June 1942 Rommel and his Africa Korps in a long counter offensive against Ritchie, had captured Tobruk with 25,000 and pushed on within 70 miles of Alexandria. Auchinleck replaced Ritchie, with Cunningham and Tedder commanding sea and air components. There was no cause for British optimism as the build-up of her ground and air had been seriously influenced by her disastrous campaign in Greece which had cost her 50,000 men.
Mihailovich was asked to harass the Germans in this area and retard the flow of supplies through the Vardar Valley to Salonika. How well he did this was attested to by radio messages from Auchinleck, Cunningham and Tedder on 16 August 1942.
By October Allied reinforcements swelled the British command in North Africa sufficiently to permit Montgomery to match strength with Rommel in El Alamein. With the Allied landing in French North Africa on 8 November the Axis were through in Africa.
During this period Mihailovich suffered 20,000 casualties stopping the German supply route, and on 16 December 1942, 2500 hostages were executed by the Nazis in Belgrade.

These are debts of Britain and her Allies! To Mihailovic not Tito.

Secrets of War - The Balkan Tinderbox

This part of the Documentry "Secrets of War - The Balkan Tinderbox" on the History channel shows that Draza's Cetniks were more successful in fighting the Axis forces then the Partizans before the Allies switched support. It also shows how Communists distorted British intelligence to make the Partizans look better. It just goes to show that Mihajlovic was fighting the Nazi's contrary to Tito's propaganda after the war. The myth that Cetniks were just hiding in the woods singing songs and drinking while the Germans and Ustase were killing people is all a lie. And that Mihajlovic only fought the nazi's in 1941 and then joined them is an even bigger lie. Sure some groups that also called themselves Cetniks were allied with the Nazi's (Pecanac's Cetniks etc) but they were enemies of Mihajlovic.

What Tito didnt want you to see

Propaganda book portraying Cetniks as collaborators. Here on the front page on the right and left sides, German officers are supposedly standing besides Cetniks, in addition to Germans crouching in the front row.

No German officers. That photo was taken with rescued American pilots

Hidden photos of Communists colluding with Germans.


March 1943

Germans launch reprisals, killing Serbian civilians due to Draza's attacks on the occupiers. Dated 1943.

German propaganda paper declares Draza Mihajlovic an enemy of the Serbian people, announcing that all Chetnik prisoners and sympathizers of Draza are to be executed. Dated 1943.
Retaliation for resistance

In 1943, the Nazis issued a standing offer for the capture of General Draza Mihailovich, dead or alive. The reward was 100,000 gold Reichsmarks. The Germans did not succeed.

Veterans share WW2 survival and rescue story

Quote from the book "The Forgotten 500" describing OSS agent Arthur Jubilians first meeting with General Draza Mihajlovic:

"In the Serb fashion that they were getting used to, the village erupted into jubilant celebration with plum brandy and music, capped by a visit from Mihailovich himself. Jubilian was in awe at the already legendary General, feeling awkward in front of the charasmatic leader, especially because the OSS was so informal, with little attension to military protocol. He almost never saluted his OSS officers, but Jubilian felt that he was an enlisted man in the presence of a famous Serbian general, so he snapped off a sharp salute when introduced to Mihailovich. The young American was pleased to find out that despite his reputation as a fierce guerilla leader, Mihailovich was down to earth as anyone he had ever met. Like every other American who met Mihailovich personally, however, Jubilian was taken by the way a man of such simplicity could at the same time give such an impression of grandeur. Jubilian and the other Allied soldiers were most impressed by Mihailovich's sense of dignity in the face of extreme hardship and insurmountable odds, and the humble way he recieved accolades from his followers, consistently coming away with the same unshakable impression that they were standing in the presence of greatness. More than one airman reported that meeting with Mihailovich actually made them feel physically small, though Mihailovich was merely of average height and build. Mihailovich was known to be even-tempered for the most part, despite his recent outburst about the British, and though he was not necessarily considered a great intellect by most of his peers, his sense of duty to his country and his people was unquestioned. He was a man of great warmth and personality, kindly and paternal to everyone around him, though he was also a strict disciplinarian with his troops. Mihailovich was renowned for his simplicity, his insistence that he be one with the common people, never above them or his soldiers. He always preferred eating a meal on the ground with his troops to sitting inside a dining room with other officers, and everyone around him knew that his greatest joy was to live among the common people in their own communities - eating with them, dancing, joining in their festivals, singing folk songs and playing a guitar. He dressed as his soldiers dressed, ate what they ate, and refused anything that even implied a privileged status. His followers loved him for it and commonly called him Chicha, the Serbian word for uncle. The Americans saw Mihailovich best whenever the local villagers came to see him, always bringing gifts of wine and flowers, the women eager to kiss him on the cheek and pose for a picture with the general. Mihailovich was extremely fond of children, and whenever he passed through villagers the schoolmaster would declare a holiday so the children could swarm Mihailovich, eager to touch the hero. Mihailovich often would tease the boys in the group by saying he had heard that one of them was a Partisan and then ask which was loyal to Tito "Ne ja, Chicha!" Not I, Uncle! each boy would yell in return. Mihailovich continued teasing them, eyeing them suspiciously, pointing to first one and then another, saying "I have definate information. It is you?" The boys would continue laughing and yelling "Ne ja, Chicha!" untill finally Mihailovich relented and patted the boys on the back, saying, "i see you're all good Serbs. I shall have to tell my intelligence that they were wrong." The stories Jibilian had heard of Mihailovich were confirmed when he saluted the general and recieved a salute in return, then hung around for a while to exchange a few pleasantries and listen in as Mihailovich talked with Musulin and the other Americans about the upcoming rescue. Followers were always crowded around, seeking close proximity to this local celebrity, a celebrity without pretense who didnt mind a farmer suddenly giving him a bear hug and insisting on sharing a cup of plum brandy."

Newspaper articles from the WW2 era

Partizan collaboration

A German memorandum states that the German-Partisan conversation took place in Gornji Vakuf (west of Sarajevo) on March 11, 1943, from 9:30 to 11 A.M. . . . During the March discussions, the Partisan delegation stressed that the Partisans saw no reason for fighting the German Army - they added that they fought against German troops only in self-defense - but wished solely to fight the Chetniks; that they were oriented toward the propaganda of the Soviet Union only because they rejected any connection with the British; that they would fight the British should the latter land in Yugoslavia; that they did not intend to capitulate, but inasmuch as they wanted to concentrate on fighting the Chetniks, they wished to suggest respective territories of interest.

^A Communist Partisan officer, right, with German officers of the 7th SS Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen”.

The content of this German memorandum of conversation is confirmed by a document which the Partisan delegation left behind and which bears the signatures of the three Partisan emissaries. In it Djilas, Velebit and Popovic proposed not only further prisoner exchanges and German recognition of the right of the Partisans as combatants but, what was more important, the cessation of hostilities between German forces and the Partisans. The three delegates confirmed in writing that the Partisans ‘regard the Chetniks as their main enemy. . . A few days later, on March 17, the German Minister in Zagreb, Kasche, sent a telegram to Berlin in which, clearly referring to the German-Partisan talks, he reported the possibility ‘that Tito and supporters will cease to fight against Germany, Italy and Croatia and retire to the Sandzak in order to settle matters with Mihailovic’s Chetniks.’Meanwhile in the wake of the discussions between the three high Partisan representatives and Lieutenant General Dippold, further talks were arranged at Zagreb. . . . Velebit and Djilas passed again through the German lines and were brought by a German military plane from Sarajevo to Zagreb on March 25, 1943. There they had talks with Glaise von Horstenau and his staff.

Milovan Djilas and Vladimir Velebit met with German General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, above, in Zagreb.

Not having received a reply from Ribbentrop to his message of March 17, Kasche sent another telegram to his Foreign Minister on March 26, 1943, in which he reported that two duly authorized representatives of Tito had arrived in Zagreb for the purpose of discussions with German, Italian and Croatian military representatives. One of them, Kasche said, was Dr. Petrovic, a Croat, and the other a Montenegrin by the name of Markovic These people, he added, again offered to stop fighting if they could be left in peace in the Sandzak. . . .On March 29, Ribbentrop sent Kasche a telegram in which he prohibited all contact with the Partisans and asked on what Kasche based his optimism. . . .The discussions between the Partisan representatives and the Germans in Zagreb regarding a possible cessation of hostilities got nowhere, not only because the Partisan proposals were unacceptable to the Germans but, above all, because Berlin utterly opposed any accommodation with the Partisans. When apprised of the Zagreb contacts, Hitler reportedly said: ‘One does not negotiate with rebels - rebels must be shot.’”. . . . The fact remains, however, that the Partisans, who labeled Mihailovic and the Chetniks traitors for their accommodation with the enemy, sent two high-ranking officers to the German general in Zagreb with the purpose of arranging a cease-fire, after having declared in writing that their main enemies were the Chetniks and not the occupying Axis forces.No wonder that there is great sensitivity in Yugoslav Communist circles about that chapter in history. None of the official Yugoslav documents mentions the Velebit-Djilas trip to Zagreb, while every possible Chetnik Axis meeting is duly recorded.”Robert’s primary sources for these meetings and discussions between the Partisans and German forces concerning collaboration were based on the Nuremberg Armed Forces High Command document series which was assembled by prosecutors at the Nuremberg war crimes trials by the U.S. The document that disclosed the meeting was NOKW 1088, Record Group 238. The Communist dictatorship that Tito established after the war covered-up and suppressed this evidence of Communist Partisan collaboration with Nazi forces.

Communist mole and spy James Klugman falsified reports and data in support of the Communist Partisan forces of Tito, backed and supported by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union.Tito’s objective was thus to negotiate an end to hostilities and to combat between Communist Partisans and German occupation forces. The goal was to allow Tito to concentrate on destroying the Chetnik forces under Draza Mihailovich before a possible Allied landing that would allow a link up of Allied forces and Chetnik forces that would ensure Mihailovich’s victory in the civil war conflict in Yugoslavia. Mihailovich had not yet been completely abandoned and betrayed by the British and the U.S. Because the british and the U.S supported Mihailovich over the Communist Partisans, Tito and the Partisan leaders were willing to collaborate with the Nazis occupation forces and to engage in combat against British and U.S forces if doing so would allow them to prevent the Chetnik guerrilla movement from being recognized by the Allies.

Finally, the Communist Partisans “collaborated” with the Nazis from the time of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact from August 23, 1939. When Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, the Communist partizans did not resist the invasion. It was only when the Soviet Union was attacked on June 22, 1941, that the Partisans change this collaborationist policy. The decision to begin an armed struggle against the Nazi occupation forces was not made until a July 4, 1941 meeting held in Belgrade on 4 July 1941. The Communists celebrate the Day of Uprising on July 7, when a Communist murdered two Serbian officials. The Partizan resistance began with the murder of two Serbs, not with any resistance against Nazi troops. According to Djilas, in 1945 Communist partisan leaders decided that was it decided that July 7 should be the anniversary for the beginning of resistance, when shots were fired “at gendarmes and not at the Germans.” From April 6, 1941 to July 7, 1941, the Partizans collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces. Only when the Soviet Union was attacked were they reluctantly forced to began a resistance. Draza Mihailovich and the Chetnik forces, by contrast, had launched a resistance movement from the start of the German invasion of Yugoslavia.The documented proof that Tito’s Communist Partisans collaborated with the Nazis challenges the assumptions that the Partisans represented the popular will of the population of Yugoslavia and that they were an effective and viable resistance movement. The evidence of Partisan collaboration shows that the Communist Partisans were obsessed with achieving power and establishing a Soviet-style and Stalinist-style Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia at all costs and by whatever means necessary, even collaboration with German occupation forces. This evidence provides historical background and context on the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Military force, in the form of Soviet tanks and troops of the Red Army, put Tito into power in Belgrade. The bullet, not the ballot, established the Communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia under Tito. Moreover, the rejection and betrayal of Allied ally Draza Mihailovich and the support of the Communist faction by the U.S. and Britain gave the Partisans the decisive advantage in the civil war conflict. This evidence supports the argument that foreign intervention in the Yugoslav conflict from 1941-1945, by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain, resulted in a Communist Partisan takeover of the Yugoslav government and the creation of a Communist dictatorship. Without this foreign intervention, the Communist Partisans were forced to collaborate with the Nazis because they faced defeat and loss in the conflict with Draza Mihailovich’s forces.